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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 613 
Accident time: 08:35 Accident Date: 04/10/2009 
Where it occurred: MF 
AF12401/21529/MF54




Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report:  
ID original source: OPS, 14/01-26 Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: hard 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned Summary supplied as a PDF file.  Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some 
formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as 
more information becomes available. 
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The accident summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) 
File: OPS, 14/01-26 
Date: November 30, 2009  
Subject: INVESTIGATION REPORT & LESSONS LEARNED OF [Demining group] - CBDT-2 
DEMINING ACCIDENT  
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of [Demining group] CBDT-
2 demining accident occurred on 04 October 2009 in Khoshal village, Daman district of 
Kandahar Province. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] CBDT-02 DEMINING ACCODENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the Deminer of [Demining group] CBDT-02. The accident occurred at 
08:35 hours on 04 Oct 2009 at the minefield number AF12401/21529/MF545, located in 
Khoshal village, Daman district of Kandahar province. 
SUMMARY: 
MF # 545 is an anti-personnel contaminated area, located in eastern side of Kandahar 
Airport, part of mine belt around Kandahar Airfield (KAF). The area was of great importance 
from the military point of view, so the Russian troops planted mines there to protect their 
positions from the attacks of Mujahedeen and secure the KAF. 
On 04 Oct 2009 at 08:35 hrs when [the Victim] deminer was working on a signal in his 
clearance lane using a pickaxe, he hit the mine on its top and caused it to go off. According to 
the investigation report the ground surface was hard and the deminer was using the pick 
without informing his section leader with a wrong procedure for excavation of the detected 
signal, and caused the mine to be exploded. As a result of the accident, the involve deminer 
got superficial injures on his face and body. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
However the deminer was trained how to conduct investigation on a detected signal, but he 
ignored the standard operating procedure and directly started from the pinpointed spot with a 
pick. Another factor in such accidents is poor supervision, as the command group failed to 
stop them from such a practice. 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
a. The [Demining group] Operations deportment is to take more professional steps to build up 
a strong capacity of command and control mechanism within their teams. 
b. Good planning and site study for recognizing alternative solutions to safely handle 
operations in problematic portions of the clearance site through supervisor and team leaders 
is highly recommended. 
c. It is also the responsibility of command group to urge and advise the Deminers to strictly 
adhere to the SOP/AMAS. 
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d. As this is the one of several accidents with the same scenario (due to unprofessional use of 
pick) in Southern area, so it is to be taken to consideration by external QA as well. 
e. The [Demining group] management should take necessary action in order to prevent 
recurrence of such accidents in future and inform MACCA OPS department of their action no 
later than 7 days after the issue date of this letter. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 796 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not made available 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Body, minor Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the Victim 
was using the pick incorrectly and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed 
as a Management Control Inadequacy because the investigators identified a management 
failing in building the required command and control capacity in the field. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of the accident summary 
implies that the Afghan investigators did make a comprehensive report and the failure of the 
UN to share it with others is regrettable.   
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